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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks.
This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their opponents and
the communication graph is not necessarily the same as the players’ cost dependency graph. We develop a relatively fast
algorithm within the framework of inexact-ADMM, based on local information exchange between the players. We prove its
convergence to Nash equilibrium for fixed step-sizes and analyze its convergence rate. Numerical simulations illustrate its
benefits when compared to a consensus-based gradient type algorithm with diminishing step-sizes.
Key words: Game theory over networks, distributed algorithms, noncooperative games, communication graph.
1 Introduction
We consider distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking
in a setting where players have limited local informa-
tion, over a communication network. In contrast to the
classical setting where all players have access to all their
opponents’ decisions Scutari et al. (2014), Frihauf et al.
(2012), Kannan and Shanbhag (2012), our interest lies
in networked regimes where agents may only access or
observe the decisions of their neighbours, and there is no
central node that has bidirectional communication with
all players. This is a topic of increasing recent interest
given the proliferation of engineering networked appli-
cations requiring distributed protocols that operate un-
der partial, local information (V2V, P2P, ad-hoc, smart-
grid networks), and the deregulation of global markets.
Applications that motivate us to consider NE seeking in
such a setting range from spectrum access in cognitive
radio networks, Wang et al. (2010), Cheng et al. (2014),
Swenson et al. (2015), rate control and congestion games
in wireless, vehicular or ad-hoc networks, Alpcan and
Bas¸ar (2005), Yin et al. (2011), Tekin et al. (2012), to
networked Nash-Cournot competition, Bimpikis et al.
(2014), Koshal et al. (2016), and opinion dynamics in
social networks, Ghaderi and Srikant (2014), Bimpikis
et al. (2016). For example, in cognitive radio networks
users adaptively adjust their operating parameters based
on interactions with the environment and other users
in the network, Wang et al. (2010). In a vehicular ad-
hoc network setting, vehicles on the road often maintain
a relatively stable topology and form clusters wherein
vehicles can communicate one with another. A best-
response algorithm for channel selection is proposed in
Cheng et al. (2014), based on vehicles within a cluster
communicating with each other, while selfishly trying to
maximize their own utilities. A similar information ex-
change setting is considered in Swenson et al. (2015),
where because players are unable to directly observe the
actions of all others, they engage in local, non-strategic
information exchange to eventually agree on a common
Nash equilibrium. In an economic setting, Bramoulle´
et al. (2014) draws attention to the problem of “who
interacts with whom” in a network and to the impor-
tance of communication with neighbouring players. An
example is Nash-Cournot competition played over a net-
work, between a set of firms that compete over a set of
locations, Bimpikis et al. (2014). A communication net-
work is formed between the firms, and prescribes how
they communicate locally their production decision over
those locations, Koshal et al. (2016). All these examples
are non-cooperative in the way decisions are made (each
agent is self-interested in minimizing only its own cost),
but collaborative in information sharing (agents have the
incentive to exchange information with their neighbours
in order to mitigate the lack of global information on
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others’ decisions). Unlike the classical setting, where all
others’ decisions are known and information exchange
is not incentive compatible, in a partial-decision infor-
mation setting (not usually considered in classical game
theory), information exchange is motivated because of
the limited data each player has. Such an information
exchange setting has started to be considered very re-
cently, Swenson et al. (2015), Koshal et al. (2016), Sale-
hisadaghiani and Pavel (2016), but convergence is guar-
anteed only for diminishing step-sizes. Motivated by the
above, in this paper we develop a distributed NE seeking
algorithm that operates under limited (partial) decision-
information, and is guaranteed to converge to NE with
constant step-sizes. Each player updates his decision and
his estimate simultaneously in a single step, based on lo-
cal information exchange with his neighbours.
We use an ADMM approach to develop the algorithm.
Originally developed in 1970s, the Alternating Direc-
tion Method of Multipliers (ADMM) method has be-
come widely used in distributed optimization problems
(DOP) after its re-introduction in Boyd et al. (2011),
Wei and Ozdaglar (2012), Wei and Ozdaglar (2013), Shi
et al. (2014), Chang et al. (2015), Hong et al. (2016). In
a DOP, N agents cooperatively minimize a global objec-
tive, f(y) :=
∑N
i=1 fi(y), over y ∈ Ω, by communicating
over a connected graph. The problem is reformulated by
introducing a separate decision variable xi for each agent
i and imposing the equality constraint xi = xj for all
agents connected by an edge (neighbours), leading tominimizex f(x) :=
N∑
i=1
fi(xi)
subject to Ax = 0, xi ∈ Ω ∀i = 1, . . . , N
(1)
where x = [xi]
N
i=1, A is the edge-node incidence matrix.
ADMM for DOP relies on the additive structure and sep-
arability of the objective function (1) and on the linearity
of the equality constraints. Each agent i will minimize
its cost fi(xi) over xi and this fi is independent (decou-
pled) of the other agents’ xj , j 6= i. Dual decomposition
leads to N parallel decoupled dual ascent problems.
In this work, we exploit the benefits of ADMM in the
context of finding a NE of a game, where each player
(agent) i aims to minimize its own cost function Ji with
respect to (w.r.t) its action xi, given a profile of other
players’ actions, except himself, x−i,{
minimize
xi
Ji(xi, x−i)
subject to xi ∈ Ωi
∀i = 1, . . . , N. (2)
We consider a networked information exchange setting
as in the motivating examples, due to players’ limited
(partial) information on the others’ decisions. There are
several challenges when comparing a game to a DOP:
• A Nash game can be seen as a set of parallel coupled
optimization problems, (2). Each player’s cost is de-
pendent on the other players’ decisions, hence its de-
cision is directly affected by these.
• Each player i updates only its own decision xi, but he
also requires an estimate of all others [xj ]j=1,...,N, j 6=i,
or x−i, in order to solve its optimization problem.
We introduce local estimates of players’ actions and (vir-
tual) constraints for their consensus. We reformulate the
problem and relate it to a modified game (a set of op-
timization problems) with consensus constraints. As in
classical ADMM we reduce the computational costs by
using a linear approximation in players’ action update
rule (inexact-ADMM). However, direct application of
ADMM is not possible because each minimization is not
over the whole vector (estimate), but rather over part of
it (action). Every player updates its decision/action as
well as its estimates of the other players’ actions by this
synchronous, inexact ADMM-type algorithm, using its
own estimates and those of its neighbours. We show that
the algorithm converges to NE under fixed step-sizes, the
first such algorithm to the best of our knowledge. A short
version appears in Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2017),
Shi and Pavel (2017) under stronger assumptions.
Related Works. Distributed NE computation is rele-
vant to many applications, such as sensor network coor-
dination Stankovic´ et al. (2012), flow control Alpcan and
Bas¸ar (2005), optical networks, Pan and Pavel (2009). In
the classical setting of distributed NE computation using
best-response or gradient-based schemes, competitors’
decisions are assumed to be observable by all players,
Facchinei and Pang (2007), Frihauf et al. (2012). Re-
cent work in the classical setting considered games with
monotone pseudo-gradient Scutari et al. (2014); Kan-
nan and Shanbhag (2012); Yousefian et al. (2016), Zhu
and Frazzoli (2016), networked aggregative games with
quadratic cost functions, Parise et al. (2015), or games
with affine constraints, Yi and Pavel (2017, 2018). Play-
ers are assumed to have access to the others’ decisions,
so the issue of partial information on the opponents’ de-
cisions is not considered in the above works.
However, having access to all others’ decisions can be
impractical in distributed networks, Marden (2007), Li
and Marden (2013). In recent years, there has been an
increasing interest to consider this issue and how to deal
with it via networked (partial)-information exchange.
Our work is related to this literature. Consensus-based
approaches have been proposed, by using fictitious play
in congestion games, Swenson et al. (2015), or projected-
gradient algorithms, either for the special class of ag-
gregative games, Koshal et al. (2016), or for games where
players’ cost functions depend on others’ actions in a
general manner, in Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2016), or
are partially coupled, Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2018).
Convergence to the NE was shown only for diminish-
ing step-sizes, under strict monotonicity of the pseudo-
gradient. In contrast, our ADMM algorithm converges
with fixed step-sizes and has faster convergence. We note
that very recently continuous-time NE seeking dynam-
ics are proposed based on consensus and gradient-type
dynamics, for games with unconstrained action sets, Ye
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and Hu (2017), or based on passivity, Gadjov and Pavel
(2018). Differently, we develop a discrete-time NE seek-
ing algorithm for games with compact action sets, based
on an ADMM approach.
Our work is related to the large literature on ADMM
for DOP but there are several differences. In contrast to
typical ADMM algorithms developed for DOP (1) which
is separable, e.g. Wei and Ozdaglar (2012), Wei and
Ozdaglar (2013), Shi et al. (2014), Chang et al. (2015),
Hong et al. (2016), our ADMM algorithm for NE seeking
of (2) has an extra step for estimate update, besides the
update of each player’s decision variable. This is because
of the intrinsic coupling in Ji (2); the update of each
player’s action is coupled nonlinearly to this estimate
and to the others’ decisions. This is unlike ADMM for
DOP where, due to decoupled costs, the update of each
agent’s decision is only linearly coupled to the others’ de-
cisions (via the constraints). This also leads to a techni-
cal difference on the convexity assumptions under which
convergence is shown. Typical assumptions in DOP are
individual (strict/strong) joint convexity of each agent’s
decoupled cost function fi (1), Wei and Ozdaglar (2012),
Wei and Ozdaglar (2013), Shi et al. (2014), Chang et al.
(2015). In the augmented space, due to separability of
DOP (1), monotonicity of the full gradient is automat-
ically maintained. Different from that, in a game setup,
individual joint convexity is too restrictive, unless the
game is separable to start with, which is a trivial case.
Rather, a typical assumption is individual partial con-
vexity of each cost, and monotonicity (strict, strong)
of the pseudo-gradient. Furthermore, in the augmented
space of actions and estimates, due to the inherent cou-
pling in (2), monotonicity is not necessarily maintained.
We note that in ADMM for DOP (1), relaxation from
strongly convex to merely convex fi involves either an
exact augmented minimization at each step, (hence fi
needs to have inexpensive proximal-operator), Wei and
Ozdaglar (2013), or an extra quadratic augmentation,
for a sufficiently large step-size, Hong et al. (2016). In
ADMM for game (2), we use a similar idea as Hong et al.
(2016) for the extended pseudo-gradient (which may be
non-monotone in the augmented space). However, un-
like Hong et al. (2016), since cost functions Ji are not
separable, our analysis is novel, based on the decomposi-
tion of the augmented space into the consensus subspace
and its orthogonal complement. Moreover, our proof
techniques rely on the pseudo-gradient, since we cannot
employ a common Lagrangian as in DOP. Another con-
sequence is that, unlike Wei and Ozdaglar (2013), we
are able to characterize the rate of convergence only in
terms of the residuals relative to NE optimality.
The paper is organized as follows. The problem state-
ment and assumptions are provided in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3, an inexact ADMM-type algorithm is developed.
Its convergence to Nash equilibrium is analyzed in Sec-
tion 4. Simulation results are given in Section 5 and con-
clusions in Section 6.
1.1 Notations and Background
A vector x ∈ Rn may be represented in equivalent ways
as x = [x1, . . . , xn]
T = [x1; . . . ;xn], or x = [xi]i=1,...,n,
or x = (xi, x−i). All vectors are assumed to be column
vectors. Given a vector x ∈ Rn, xT denotes its transpose
and ‖x‖ =
√
xTx denotes its Euclidean norm. Given a
symmetric n × n matrix A, ‖x‖A denotes the weighted
norm ‖x‖A :=
√
xTAx. Denote 1n = [1, 1, . . . , 1]
T ∈ Rn
and 0n = [0, 0, . . . , 0]
T ∈ Rn. Let ei denote the N × 1, i-
th unit vector in Rn, whose i-th element is 1 and the rest
are 0. Given a vector x ∈ Rn, diag([xi]i=1,...,n) denotes
the n× n diagonal matrix with x1, . . . , xn on the diago-
nal. Similarly, given Ai, i = 1, . . . , n as (p× q) matrices,
diag([Ai]i=1,...,n) denotes the (np × nq) block-diagonal
matrix with Ai on the diagonal. In denotes the identity
matrix in Rn×n. The Kronecker product of matrices A
and B is denoted byA⊗B. Given matricesA,B ∈ Rn×n,
A  0 (A  0) denotes that A is positive (semi-)definite.
λmin(A) and λmax(A) represent the minimum and the
maximum eigenvalue of matrix A, respectively. Given
a m × n matrix A, ‖A‖2 denotes its induced 2-norm,
‖A‖2 = σmax(A), σmax(A) =
√
λmax(ATA). For any
a, b ∈ Rn and ρ > 0,
− 1
2ρ
‖a‖2 − ρ
2
‖b‖2 ≤ aT b ≤ 1
2ρ
‖a‖2 + ρ
2
‖b‖2. (3)
For every a, b, c ∈ Rn and n× n matrix A  0,
(a−b)TA(a−c) = 1
2
‖a−c‖2A+
1
2
‖a−b‖2A−
1
2
‖b−c‖2A. (4)
Given a set Ω ∈ Rn, |Ω| denotes the cardinality of Ω. The
Euclidean projection of x ∈ Rn onto Ω ⊂ Rn is denoted
by TΩ{x}. Denote by proxag the proximal operator for
function g with a constant a, defined as follows:
proxag{s} := arg min
x
{g(x) + a
2
‖x− s‖2}. (5)
Let IΩ(x) :=
{
0 if x ∈ Ω
∞ otherwise , be the indicator function
of a closed convex set Ω ∈ Rn. Then, proxaIΩ{·} = TΩ{·}.
Let ∂IΩ(x) denote the subdifferential of IΩ at x, i.e.,
the set of all subgradients of IΩ at x . Then ∂IΩ(x) is a
convex set and ∂IΩ(x) = NΩ(x), where NΩ(x) = {y ∈
Rn| yT (x′ − x) ≤ 0,∀x′ ∈ Ω} is the normal cone to Ω
at x. Moreover, (y1 − y2)T (x1 − x2) ≥ 0, ∀x1, x2 ∈ Ω,
∀y1 ∈ ∂IΩ(x1), ∀y2 ∈ ∂IΩ(x2), Rockafellar (1970).
For an undirected graph G(V,E), we denote by:
• V : Set of vertices in G,
• E ⊆ V × V : Set of all edges in G. (i, j) ∈ E if and
only if i and j are connected by an edge,
• Ni := {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ E}: Set of neighbours of i in G,
• A := [aij ]i,j∈V : Adjacency matrix of G where aij = 1
if (i, j) ∈ E and aij = 0 otherwise,
• D := diag(|N1|, . . . , |NN |): Degree matrix of G, d =
trace(D) =
∑N
i=1 |Ni|, d∗ = maxi{|Ni|},• L : D−A: Laplacian matrix of G,
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• LN := D− 12LD− 12 : Normalized Laplacian of G if G
has no isolated vertex.
The following hold for a graphG with no isolated vertex:
D  0, λmax(LN ) ≤ 2 and 2D−L = D 12 (2I−LN )D 12  0,
Chung (1997). For a connected, undirected graphGwith
n vertices, L  0, with 0 a simple eigenvalue and L1n =
0n, 1
T
nL = 0
T
n . The other eigenvalues of L are positive,
with minimum one λ2(L) and maximum λmax(L) ≤ 2d∗.
Also, Ker(L) = span{1n}, Ker(L)⊥ = {x|1Tnx = 0},
xTLx ≥ λ2(L)‖x‖2 > 0, ∀x 6= 0, x ∈ Ker(L)⊥.
2 Problem Statement
Consider a networked game withN players, defined with
the following parameters and denoted by G(V,Ωi, Ji):
• V = {1, . . . , N}: Set of all players,
• Ωi ⊂ R: Action set of player i, ∀i ∈ V ,
• Ω = ∏i∈V Ωi ⊂ RN : Action set of all players, where∏
denotes the Cartesian product,
• Ji : RN → R: Cost function of player i, ∀i ∈ V .
Players’ actions are denoted as follows:
• xi ∈ Ωi: Player i’s action, ∀i ∈ V ,
• x−i ∈ Ω−i :=
∏
j∈V \{i} Ωj : All players’ actions except
player i’s,
• x = (xi, x−i) ∈ Ω: All players actions.
The game is played such that for a given x−i ∈ Ω−i, ev-
ery player i ∈ V aims to minimize its own cost function
(2) with respect to (w.r.t.) xi. Note that each player’s
optimal action is dependent on the other players’ deci-
sions. A Nash equilibrium (NE) lies at the intersection of
solutions to the set of problems (2) (fixed-point of best-
response map), such that no player can reduce its cost
by unilaterally deviating from its action.
Definition 1 Consider an N -player game G(V,Ωi, Ji).
An action profile (vector) x∗ = (x∗i , x
∗
−i) ∈ Ω is called a
Nash equilibrium (NE) of this game if
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(xi, x∗−i) ∀xi ∈ Ωi, ∀i ∈ V.
We state a few assumptions for the existence of a NE,
Nash (1950); Debreu (1952); Glicksberg (1952).
Assumption 1 For every i ∈ V ,
• Ωi ⊂ R is non-empty, compact and convex,
• Ji(xi, x−i) is C1 and convex in xi, for every x−i, and
jointly continuous in x.
Let ∇iJi(x) = ∂Ji∂xi (xi, x−i) be the partial gradient of Ji
w.r.t. xi and F : RN → RN be the pseudo-gradient of
game (2) defined by
F (x) := [∇iJi(x)]i∈V (6)
Let ∂IΩi(xi) be the subdifferential of IΩi at xi and
G(x) := [∂IΩi(xi)]i∈V , where ∂IΩi(xi) = NΩi(xi). Let
NΩ(x) =
∏
i∈V NΩi(xi) be the normal cone to Ω at x.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) x∗ = (x∗i , x
∗
−i) ∈ Ω satis-
fies the variational inequality, (cf. Proposition 1.4.2,
Facchinei and Pang (2007))
(x− x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Ω,
i.e., −F (x∗) ∈ NΩ(x∗), or
−∇iJi(x∗) ∈ NΩi(x∗i ), ∀i ∈ V,
Thus, with ∂IΩi(xi) = NΩi(xi) , a NE x∗ = (x∗i , x∗−i)
of (2) can be characterized by
0∈∇iJi(x∗) + ∂IΩi(x∗i ), ∀i ∈ V, (7)
Then, with (6), (7) can be written in compact form as,
0N ∈F (x∗) +G(x∗). (8)
Typically another assumption such as monotonicity
(strict, strong) of the pseudo-gradient vector F , (6), is
used to show that projected-gradient type algorithms
converge to x∗, Facchinei and Pang (2007).
Assumption 2 The pseudo-gradient F is strongly
monotone and Lipschitz continuous: there exists µ > 0,
θ0 > 0 such that for any x and y, 〈x− y, F (x)−F (y)〉 ≥
µ‖x− y‖2 and ‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ θ0‖x− y‖.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the game has a unique
NE x∗ (Theorem 2.3.3 in Facchinei and Pang (2007)).
Strong monotonicity of F is a standard assumption un-
der which convergence of projected-gradient type algo-
rithms is guaranteed with fixed step-sizes, (Theorem
12.1.2 in Facchinei and Pang (2007)).
We assume that the cost function Ji and the action set
Ωi information are available to player i only, hence an
incomplete-information game, Li and Bas¸ar (1987). The
challenge is that each optimization problem in (2) is de-
pendent on the solution of the other simultaneous prob-
lems. In the classical setting of a game with incomplete
information but perfect monitoring, each agent can ob-
serve the actions of all other players, x−i, Facchinei and
Pang (2007), Scutari et al. (2014), Frihauf et al. (2012),
Kannan and Shanbhag (2012). In this paper, we con-
sider a game with incomplete information and imper-
fect monitoring, where no player is able to observe the
actions of all others. We refer to this as a game with
partial-decision information. To compensate for the lack
of global decision information, players exchange some in-
formation in order to update their actions. We assume
players can communicate only locally, with their neigh-
bours. An undirected communication graph Gc(V,E) is
then defined with no isolated vertex. Let denote the set
of neighbours of player i in Gc by Ni. Let also denote D
and L be the degree and Laplacian matrices associated
to Gc, respectively. The following assumption is used.
Assumption 3 Gc is undirected and connected.
We assume that players maintain estimates of the other
players’ actions and share them with their neighbours in
order to update their estimates. In an engineering appli-
cation, this step could be prescribed, e.g. as a network
protocol in peer-to-peer networks or ad-hoc networks.
Our goal is to develop a distributed algorithm for com-
puting the NE of G(V,Ωi, Ji) with fixed step-sizes, while
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Figure 1. Network Cournot game: An edge from i to Mk on
this graph implies that agent/firm i participates in Market
Mk.
using only partial-decision information over the commu-
nication graph Gc(V,E).
This is a topic of recent interest given the the prolifera-
tion of engineering networked applications requiring dis-
tributed protocols that operate under partial, local infor-
mation (e.g. ad-hoc networks or smart-grid networks),
and the deregulation of global markets. We provide next
a motivating example, inspired by the one in Koshal
et al. (2016), Kannan and Shanbhag (2012).
Example 1 (Nash-Cournot Game Over a Network).
Consider a networked Nash-Cournot game, as in Koshal
et al. (2016), Bimpikis et al. (2014) between a set of N
firms (players/agents) involved in the production of a
homogeneous commodity that compete over m markets,
M1, · · · ,Mm (Figure 1). Firm i, i ∈ V participates
in ni ≤ m markets with xi commodity amount that it
supplies to each of its markets. Hence player i’s action
(strategy) is its commodity amount per market xi ∈ R.
Its total amount it produces is xi,T = nixi, assumed to be
limited to ΩT , so that xi ∈ Ωi ⊂ R, Ωi = ΩT /ni. Firm
i has a local vector Ai ∈ Rm (with elements 1 or 0) that
specifies which markets it participates in. The k-th ele-
ment of Ai is 1 if and only if player i delivers xi amount
to market Mk. Therefore, A1, · · · , AN can be used to
specify a bipartite graph that represents the connec-
tions between firms and markets (see Figure 1). Denote
x = [xi]i∈V ∈ RN , and A = [A1, · · · , AN ] ∈ Rm×N .
Then Ax ∈ Rm = ∑Ni=1Aixi is the total product supply
to all markets, given the action profile x of all firms.
Suppose that P : Rm → Rm is a price vector function
that maps the total supply of each market to the corre-
sponding market’s price. Each firm i has a production
cost ci(xi,T ) : ΩT → R, function of its total produc-
tion amount. Then the local objective function of firm
(player) i is Ji(xi, x−i) = ci(xi,T )−PT (Ax)Aixi. Over-
all, given the other firms’ profile x−i, each firm needs to
solve the following optimization problem,
minimize
xi∈Ωi
ci(xi,T )− PT (Ax)Aixi (9)
In the classical, centralized-information setting each firm
is assumed to have instantaneous access to the others’
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8
9
10
11121314151617
18
19
20
Figure 2. Communication graph Gc: Firms i and j are able
to exchange their local xi and xj if there exists an edge
between them on this graph.
actions x−i. This may be impractical in a large net-
work of geographically distributed firms, Bimpikis et al.
(2014). For example, consider that Figure 1 depicts a
group of N = 20 firms located on different continents
that participate in m = 7 markets, with no centralized
communication system between them. Since players are
unable to directly observe the actions of all others, they
engage in local, non-strategic information exchange, to
mitigate their lack of global, centralized information.
Firms/players may communicate with a local subset of
neighbouring firms via some underlying communication
infrastructure, hence a distributed partial-information
setting. A communication network formed Gc between
the firms prescribes how they communicate locally their
production decision, Koshal et al. (2016). In this sit-
uation, the communication network is formed by the
players who are viewed as the nodes in the network. In
this example, we consider that most of the communica-
tion is between firms on the same continent, with one or
at most two firms in each continent having a direct con-
nection to another firm on another continent. One such
instance of the communication network Gc is shown in
Figure 2. Firms i and j are able to exchange their local
xi and xj if there exists an edge between them on this
graph. Various other topologies can be considered, with
different connectivity.
A Nash-Cournot game (9) can describe other practical
decision problems in engineering networks, for exam-
ple rate control games in communication networks (Yin
et al. (2011)) and demand-response games in smart-grid
networks (Ye and Hu (2017), Yi and Pavel (2018)). An-
other example, of a rate control game over a wireless
ad-hoc network, is presented in Section 5.
3 Distributed Inexact-ADMM Algorithm
In order to find the NE of G(V,Ωi, Ji) (2) over the com-
munication graph Gc(V,E), we propose a distributed
ADMM-type algorithm with fixed step-sizes (Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis (1997), p. 255), based on introducing lo-
cal estimates of players’ actions and using (virtual) con-
straints for estimate consensus.
We define a few notations for players’ estimates.
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• xi−i ∈ RN−1: Player i’s estimate of all other players’
actions,
• xii ∈ Ωi ⊂ R: Player i’s estimate of its action which is
indeed its own action, i.e., xii = xi for i ∈ V ,
• xi = (xii, xi−i) ∈ RN : Player i’s estimate of all players’
actions (state variable),
• x = [xi]i∈V or x = [x1; . . . ;xN ] ∈ RN2 : Augmented
(stacked) vector of all estimates.
Note that all players’ actions x can be represented as
x = [xii]i∈V . In steady-state all local copies x
i should be
equal. By employing the actions’ estimates xi, ∀i ∈ V ,
(local copies of x), we can reformulate game (2) as:minimizexii∈Ωi Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i), ∀i ∈ V
subject to xi = xj , ∀j s.t. (i, j), (j, i) ∈ E
(10)
where E is the set of edges of Gc. For each agent i we
consider the constraint that the estimate (local copy) xi
is equal to xj of its neighbours for all cases where xi is
involved, i.e., player i is either a source or a destination,
as specified via ordered pairs (i, j) ∈ E and (j, i) ∈ E.
Under Assumption 3 this ensures that x1 = x2 . . . =
xN , hence (10) recovers (2). The following distributed
ADMM-type algorithm is proposed.
Algorithm 1 Inexact-ADMM Algorithm
1: initialization
xii(0) ∈ Ωi, xi−i(0) ∈ RN−1, wi(0) = 0N
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . do
3: for each player i ∈ V do
4: players i, j ∀j ∈ Ni exchange xi(k−1), xj(k−1)
5:
wi(k) = wi(k−1)+c∑j∈Ni(xi(k−1)−xj(k−1))
6: xii(k) =TΩi
{
α−1i
[
−∇iJi(xii(k−1), xi−i(k−1))−wii(k)
+βix
i
i(k−1) +c¯
∑
j∈Ni(x
i
i(k−1)+xji (k−1))
]}
7: xi−i(k)=
βix
i
−i(k−1)+¯c
∑
j∈Ni
(xi−i(k−1)+xj−i(k−1))−wi−i(k)
αi
8: end for
9: end for
Here αi = βi + 2c¯|Ni|, c¯ = c+ c0, where c > 0, c0 > 0,
βi > 0 are penalty parameters for the augmented La-
grangian and proximal first-order approximation. Be-
sides its estimates, each player i needs to maintain only
its dual variables wi, and needs only the information on
its Ωi set. The derivation of Algorithm 1 following an
ADMM approach adapted to a game setup is provided
in Appendix A.
Algorithm 1 has a gradient-play structure for a game
with estimate consensus constraints: Step 6 uses a
projected-gradient (due to Ji) of an augmented La-
grangian with quadratic-penalty and proximal lineariza-
tion (inexact ADMM) (see (A.10) in Appendix A). So
in this sense, in the context of individual rationality, it
can be interpreted as a better-response (as opposed to
best-response) strategy, but in the modified game, due
to partial-information setting. Step 5 updates the dual
variables wi via a dual ascent. Compared to a gossip-
based algorithm, Koshal et al. (2016), Salehisadaghiani
and Pavel (2016), the additional ADMM-induced mod-
ifications are instrumental to prove convergence under
fixed step-sizes.
Remark 1 We compare Algorithm 1 to typical ADMM
DOP algorithms. Unlike Wei and Ozdaglar (2012), Wei
and Ozdaglar (2013), where a minimization subproblem
is solved exactly at each iteration, Algorithm 1 uses a gra-
dient update based on inexact (proximal) approximation
as in Hong et al. (2016). In contrast to either of these
algorithms, the update of each player decision xii (Step
6) is indirectly coupled nonlinearly to the previous deci-
sions of other players, via its estimate xi−i, due to the
intrinsic coupling in Ji. This is unlike ADMM for DOP
where the update of each agent’s decision variable xi is
only linearly coupled to the others agents’ xj. Moreover,
in Algorithm 1 each player has an extra step for updating
its estimate xi−i (Step 7), in addition to its decision vari-
able xii. Because of this coupling the convergence proof
(based on the pseudo-gradient) is more involved.
Next we analyze the fixed points of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1 Consider that Assumptions 1, 3 hold. Let
x := [xi]i∈V , w := [wi]i∈V be any fixed points of Algo-
rithm 1. Then, x = 1N ⊗x, where x = x∗ is NE of game
(2), and (1TN ⊗ IN )w = 0N .
Proof . From Step 5 of Algorithm 1, for all i ∈ V ,
wi = wi + c
∑
j∈Ni(x
i − xj) ⇒ (L⊗ IN )x = 0N2
and by Assumption 3, this yields x = 1N ⊗ x, for some
x = [xi]i∈V ∈ RN , hence
x1 = . . . = xN = x, (11)
Using (11) in Step 6 of Algorithm 1 yields, (βi +
2c¯|Ni|)xi − αixi ∈ ∇iJi(x) + ∂IΩi(xi) + wii. With
αi = βi + 2c¯|Ni| this leads to
0∈∇iJi(x) + ∂IΩi(xi) + wii, ∀i ∈ V
Moreover, using (11) in Step 7 of Algorithm 1, we obtain
αix
i
−i = αix
i
−i − wi−i, hence
wi−i = 0N−1 ∀i ∈ V
Combining the previous two relations into a single vec-
tor, yields
0N∈∇iJi(x)ei + ∂IΩi(xi)ei + wi, ∀i ∈ V (12)
where ei is the i-th unit vector in RN . Summing after
i ∈ V , with F (x) = [∇iJi(x)]i∈V , yields
0N∈F (x) +G(x) +
∑
i∈V
wi. (13)
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For wi(k), from Step 5 of Algorithm 1, it follows that∑
i∈V
wi(k) =
∑
i∈V
wi(k−1)+c
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
(xi(k−1)−xj(k−1))
(14)
Under Assumption 3 the second term in (14) is zero,
hence
∑
i∈V w
i(k) =
∑
i∈V w
i(k−1) for any k ≥ 1. With
initial conditions wi(0) = 0N ∀i ∈ V this implies that∑
i∈V w
i(k) = 0N ∀k ≥ 1, hence
∑
i∈V w
i = 0N . Thus
(13) reduces to 0N∈F (x) + G(x), hence by (8) x = x∗
is NE and x = 1N ⊗ x∗. Moreover,
(1TN ⊗ IN )w =
∑
i∈V
wi = 0N (15)

Recall the pseudo-gradient (6), F (x) = [∇iJi(x)]i∈V .
Definition 2 Let F : RN2 → RN , be the extension of F
to the augmented space, defined as
F(x) := [∇iJi(xi)]i∈V , ∇iJi(xi) = ∂Ji
∂xii
(xii, x
i
−i) (16)
and called the extended pseudo-gradient. Let also
G(x) := [∂IΩi(x
i
i)]i∈V , so G(x) = G(x).
Note that F is the pseudo-gradient evaluated at esti-
mates instead of actual actions, and F(1N ⊗x) = F (x).
We write Algorithm 1 in a compact vector form.
Proposition 1 Let x = [xi]i∈V , w = [wi]i∈V . Then the
updates in Algorithm 1 have the following vector form:
w(k) = w(k − 1) + cLx(k − 1) (17)
0N2 ∈ R (F(x(k − 1)) + G(x(k))) + w(k) (18)
+((B+2c¯D)⊗IN )(x(k)−x(k−1))+c¯Lx(k−1),
where R = diag([ei]i∈V ) is (N2×N) block-diagonal ma-
trix with unit vectors ei, L = L⊗ IN , F, G as in (16), D
is the degree matrix of Gc, L is the Laplacian matrix of
Gc, B := diag((βi)i∈V ) with βi > 0, c¯ = c+ c0, c, c0 > 0.
Proof . See Appendix B.
Properties of F and matrices R and L play a key role
in the following. Matrix RT allows action selection from
the stacked x: RTx = [eTi x
i]i∈V = x, based on eTi x
i =
xii =xi. Also (1
T
N ⊗ IN )R = IN , RTR = IN . For matrix
L, Ker(L)=Ker(L⊗IN )=span{1N⊗IN} (the consensus
subspace), and Ker(L)⊥=span(L)=Ker{1TN⊗IN}.
Note that by Lemma 1, x = 1N ⊗ x ∈ Ker(L) and
w ∈ span(L) (cf. (15)). Also, we can write (12) as,
0N2∈ [∇iJi(x)ei]i∈V + [∂IΩi(xi)ei]i∈V + w
or, with F, G as in (16), compactly as,
0N2∈R (F(x) + G(x)) + w. (19)
4 Convergence Analysis
In this section we show global convergence of Algo-
rithm 1 under the following assumption.
Assumption 4 The extended pseudo-gradient F, (16),
is Lipschitz continuous: there exists θ > 0 such that for
any x and y, ‖F(x)− F(y))‖ ≤ θ‖x− y‖.Remark 2 In the general case when F is nonlinear, asufficient condition for Assumption 4 is that F is C1
with bounded Jacobian ‖DF(x)‖2. For quadratic games,
Assumption 4 is automatically satisfied (F is linear).
Moreover, as shown below, θ = θ0, where θ0 is the
Lipschitz constant of F (Assumption 2). Consider the
Nash-Cournot game in Example 1, where firm i’s pro-
duction cost is a strongly convex quadratic function in
its total production amount, ci(xi,T ) = qix
2
i,T + bixi,T ,
i.e., ci(xi) = n
2
i qix
2
i +nibixi, where qi > 0, bi ∈ R. Con-
sider that market Mk’s price is a linear function of the
total supplied commodity amount, pk(x) = P¯k − zk[Ax]k
(known as a linear inverse demand function) with
P¯k, zk > 0. Denote P = [pk]k=1,m : RN → Rm,
P¯ = [P¯ ]k=1,m ∈ Rm, Z = diag([zk]k=1,m) ∈ Rm×m, so
that P = P¯ − ZAx is the vector price function, hence
the objective function of player i is
Ji(xi, x−i) = ci(xi)− (P¯ − ZAx)TAixi and (20)
∇iJi(x) = ∇ci(xi) +ATi ZAixi −ATi (P¯ − ZAx), (21)
where ∇ci(xi) = 2n2i qixi+nibi. Then, with x = [xi]i∈V ,
A = [A1, · · ·AN ], F (x) = [∇iJi(x)]i∈V is given by
F (x) = ∇c(x) + diag([ATi ZAi]i∈V )x+ATZAx−AT P¯
where ∇c(x) = 2diag([n2i qi]i∈V )x + [nibi]i∈V . Combin-
ing terms, F (x) can be written compactly as,
F (x) = Qx+ r, where Q := Σ +ATZA, (22)
Σ := diag
(
[2n2i qi+A
T
i ZAi]i∈V
)
and r := [nibi]i∈V−AT P¯ .
Since qi > 0 and zk > 0, Σ  0 and ATZA  0, hence
Q  0. Thus F (x) is Lipschitz continuous with θ0 =
‖Q‖2 where ‖Q‖2 = σmax(Q).
Using (21) with x replaced by xi = (xi, x
i
−i), yields
∇iJi(xi) = ∇ci(xi) +ATi ZAixi −ATi (P¯ − ZAxi).
Thus, F(x) := [∇iJi(xi)]i∈V , (16), is given by
F(x)=∇c(x)+diag([ATi ZAi]i∈V)x−AT P¯
+diag
(
[ATi ZA]i∈V
)
x
Using ∇c(x), Σ and r defined above, and RT (IN ⊗
ATZA) = diag
(
[eTi A
TZA]i∈V
)
for the last term, yields
F(x) = ΣRTx + r + RT (IN ⊗ATZA) x.
where x = RTx was used. Since Σ is block-diagonal,
ΣRT = RT(IN ⊗ Σ), and with Q (22) we can write
F(x) = Q x + r, where Q := RT (IN ⊗Q). (23)
Hence, ‖F(x) − F(y)‖ ≤ ‖Q‖2‖x − y‖, where ‖Q‖2 =
‖RT (IN ⊗ Q)‖2 ≤ ‖RT ‖2‖IN ⊗ Q‖2 = ‖Q‖2 since
‖R‖2 = 1 and ‖IN ⊗Q‖2 = ‖Q‖2, and thus θ = θ0.
Remark 3 Note that Assumption 4 on F is weaker than
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strong monotonicity in Ye and Hu (2017)), or cocoercivty
in Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2017), Shi and Pavel
(2017). In ADMM for DOP, cocoercivity of the full gradi-
ent is used, which is automatically satisfied by joint con-
vexity of each decoupled fi, (1), and Lipschitz continuity
of its gradient (see Chang et al. (2015)). In contrast, in
a game, because of coupling to the others’ actions in Ji
(2) and because of partial convexity (see Assumption 1),
monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient is not automatically
satisfied when extended to the augmented space. The next
result shows how under Assumption 4, a monotonicity
property can be achieved in the augmented space.
Lemma 2 Consider that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold
and let
Ψ =
 µN − θ+θ02√N
− θ+θ0
2
√
N
c0λ2(L)− θ
 (24)
Then, for any c0 > cmin where cminλ2(L) =
(θ+θ0)
2
4µ + θ,
Ψ  0, and for any x and any y ∈ Ker(L),
(x−y)T(RF(x)−RF(y)+c0L(x−y))≥ µ¯‖x−y‖2, (25)
where µ¯ := λmin(Ψ) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark 4 For quadratic games (see Remark 2),
θ = θ0 = ‖Q‖2, F (x) is strongly monotone with µ =
λmin(Q) > 0 (by Assumption 2), hence the c0 bound in
Lemma 2 simplifies to c0λ2(L) >
‖Q‖22
µ + ‖Q‖2. Further-
more, if Q is symmetric, ‖Q‖2 = σmax(Q) = λmax(Q),
and this reduces to c0 >
λmax(Q)
λ2(L)
(λmax(Q)λmin(Q) + 1), showing
the trade-off between game properties and communica-
tion graph connectivity.
Lemma 2 shows that, for a sufficiently large c0, RF(x)+
c0Lx is strongly monotone in a restricted set of direc-
tions x − y, where y ∈ Ker(L). We can call RF a
pre-L-monotone function, related to the concept of pre-
monotone gradient of a prox-regular function, Poliquin
and Rockafellar (1996). In fact, being in a restricted
set of directions, this is a weaker monotonicity prop-
erty, similar to the notion of restricted strong convexity
used in DOP and high-dimensional statistical estimation
Zhang (2017), Agarwal et al. (2010), Negahban et al.
(2009). To show this key property, an instrumental step
is the decomposition of the augmented space RN2 into
the consensus subspace, Ker(L) (where F is strongly
monotone), and its orthogonal complement, Ker(L)⊥
(where L is strongly monotone). Based on the Lipschitz
continuity of F, for a sufficiently large c0, excess strong
monotonicity of c0L can balance the cross-terms (short-
age of monotonicity of RF) when x is off the consensus
subspaceKer(L), but not onKer(L)⊥, (see proof in Ap-
pendix B). We show next that this property is sufficient
to prove convergence of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1 Consider that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4
hold. Take an arbitrary c > 0, any c0 > cmin, with cmin
as in Lemma 2, and let c¯ = c+ c0. If βi > 0 are chosen
such that
λmin(B+ 2c¯D− cL) > θ¯
2
2µ¯
(26)
where B := diag((βi)i∈V ), D and L are the degree and
Laplacian matrices of Gc, θ¯ = θ + 2c0d
∗, d∗ is the max-
imal degree of Gc and µ¯ is defined in Lemma 2, then the
sequence {xi(k)} ∀i ∈ V , or {x(k)}, generated by Algo-
rithm 1 converges to NE of game (2) x∗, (or 1N ⊗ x∗).
Proof . Recall that G(x(k))=G(x(k))=[∂IΩi(xi(k))]i∈V .
From the x-update (18) in the vector form of Algo-
rithm 1 (see Proposition 1), it follows that there exists
y ∈ G(x(k)) ⊂ RN such that,
0N2 = R (F(x(k−1))+y)+w(k)
+((B+2c¯D)⊗IN )(x(k)−x(k−1)) + c¯Lx(k−1)
or, substituting w(k) by w(k+1)−cLx(k) (cf. (18)),
0N2 = R F(x(k − 1)) + R y + w(k + 1)− cLx(k)
+((B+2c¯D)⊗ IN )(x(k)−x(k−1))+c¯Lx(k−1).
Using c¯ = c+ c0 and H := B+ 2c¯D− cL this yields
0N2 = R F(x(k − 1)) + R y + w(k + 1) (27)
+(H ⊗ IN )(x(k)−x(k−1))+c0 Lx(k−1).
Note that H := B+ c (2D−L) + 2c0D hence H ⊗ IN0,
since B0 and c (2D− L)  0.
Consider NE x∗ and let x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗. Then, from (8),
with F(1N ⊗ x∗) = F (x∗), and the definition of R, it
follows that 0N2∈RF(x∗) + RG(x∗), i.e., there exists
y∗ ∈ G(x∗) such that R F(x∗)+R y∗ = 0N2 . Moreover,
there exists q∗ ∈ RN2 (any q∗ ∈ Ker(L) with structure
1N ⊗ q˜, for q˜ ∈ RN ) such that
0N2 = R F(x
∗) + R y∗ + cLq∗. (28)
Subtracting (28) from (27), multiplying by (x(k)−x∗)T
and using RT x = x, yields(
RF(x(k − 1))−RF(x∗))T (x(k)− x∗)
+
(
y − y∗)T (x(k)− x∗)
+(w(k + 1)− cLq∗)T (x(k)− x∗) (29)
+(x(k)− x(k − 1))T (H ⊗ IN )(x(k)− x∗)
+x(k−1)T c0L(x(k)− x∗) = 0.
Combine the first and fifth term in (29) and write,(
RF(x(k−1))+c0Lx(k−1)−RF(x∗)
)T
(x(k)−x∗) (30)
=
(
RF(x(k−1))−RF(x∗) +c0Lx(k−1)
)T
(x(k−1)−x∗)
+
(
RF(x(k−1))−RF(x∗) +c0Lx(k−1)
)T
(x(k)−x(k−1)).
For the first term on the right-hand side of (30) we use
(25) in Lemma 2 (with Lx∗ = 0N2), while for the second
term we use (3) for ρ = θ¯
2
2µ¯ , θ¯ = θ+2c0d
∗. This yields,(
RF(x(k−1))−RF(x∗)+c0Lx(k−1)
)T
(x(k)−x∗)
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≥ µ¯‖x(k − 1)− x∗)‖2
− µ¯
θ¯2
‖RF(x(k−1))−RF(x∗)+c0Lx(k−1)‖2 (31)
− θ¯
2
4µ¯
‖x(k)−x(k−1)‖2.
Note that L is ‖L‖2-Lipschitz with ‖L‖2 = λmax(L) ≤
2d∗. Based on this, with Lx∗ = 0N2 , Assumption 4 for
F, ‖R‖2 = 1 and the triangle inequality, we can write
for the second term on the right-hand side of (31),
‖RF(x(k−1))−RF(x∗)+c0Lx(k−1)‖≤ θ¯‖x(k − 1)− x∗)‖
where θ¯ = θ + 2c0d
∗. Using this in (31) yields(
RF(x(k−1))−RF(x∗)+c0Lx(k−1)
)T
(x(k)−x∗)
≥ − θ¯
2
4µ¯
‖x(k)− x(k − 1)‖2 (32)
Back to (29), for the second term, since y ∈ G(x(k)),
y∗ ∈ G(x∗), IΩi is convex (Assumption 1) it follows that
(y − y∗)T (x(k)− x∗) ≥ 0. (33)
Finally for the third term in (29), we use the following.
From (18) with zero initial conditions, it follows that
w(k + 1) = cLq(k), where q(k) =
∑k
t=0 x(t). Thus,
q(k)− q(k − 1) = x(k) (34)
Then, we can write
(w(k + 1)− cLq∗)T (x(k)− x∗)
= (q(k)− q∗)T cL(q(k)− q(k − 1)− x∗)
= (q(k)− q∗)T cL(q(k)− q(k − 1))
Using (32), (33) and this last relation in (29) yields
− θ¯
2
4µ¯
‖x(k)−x(k−1)‖2+(q(k)−q∗)T cL(q(k)−q(k−1))
+(x(k)− x(k − 1))T (H ⊗ IN )(x(k)− x∗) ≤ 0, (35)
where H ⊗ IN0. Using (4) to deal with all cross-terms
in the previous inequality, yields
‖x(k)−x∗‖2H⊗IN+‖q(k)−q∗‖2cL−‖x(k−1)−x∗‖2H⊗IN
−‖q(k−1)−q∗‖2cL ≤ −‖x(k)−x(k−1)‖2H⊗IN
−‖q(k)−q(k−1)‖2cL+
θ¯2
2µ¯
‖x(k)−x(k−1)‖2.
Let us make the following notations:
z(k) :=
[
x(k)
q(k)
]
, z∗ :=
[
x∗
q∗
]
,Φ=
[
H 0N×N
0N×N cL
]
(36)
Then we can write the last inequality as
‖z(k)− z∗‖2Φ⊗IN − ‖z(k − 1)− z∗‖2Φ⊗IN
≤ −‖z(k)− z(k − 1)‖2Φ⊗IN +
θ¯2
2µ¯
‖x(k)− x(k − 1)‖2.
Moreover, since θ¯
2
2µ¯‖x(k)−x(k−1)‖2 ≤ θ¯
2
2µ¯λmin(H)
‖x(k)−
x(k− 1)‖2H⊗IN ≤ θ¯
2
2µ¯λmin(H)
‖z(k)− z(k− 1)‖2Φ⊗IN , from
the foregoing it follows that
‖z(k)− z∗‖2Φ⊗IN − ‖z(k − 1)− z∗‖2Φ⊗IN ≤ (37)
−ζ‖z(k)− z(k − 1)‖2Φ⊗IN ≤ 0,
where ζ = 1 − θ¯22µ¯λmin(H) , and 0 < ζ < 1 by (26). Sum-
ming (37) over k from 1 to∞ yields
∞∑
k=1
‖z(k)− z(k − 1)‖2Φ⊗IN≤
1
ζ
‖z(0)− z∗‖2Φ⊗IN<∞(38)
From (38) it follows that ‖z(k) − z(k − 1)‖2Φ⊗IN → 0.
From (37), since ‖z(k)−z∗‖2Φ⊗IN or ‖x(k)−x∗‖2H⊗IN +
‖q(k)− q∗‖2cL is bounded and non-increasing, it follows
that ‖x(k) − x∗‖2H⊗IN + ‖q(k) − q∗‖2cL → v, for some
v ≥ 0, where (H ⊗ IN )  0, L  0.
Any q ∈ RN2 can be decomposed as q = q‖+q⊥, where
q‖ ∈ Ker(L), q⊥ ∈ Ker(L)⊥, with (q⊥)TLq⊥ > 0,
∀q⊥ 6= 0. Decomposing q(k) and q∗ into (·)‖ and (·)⊥
components, ‖q(k) − q∗‖2cL = ‖q(k)⊥ − q∗⊥‖2cL, with
q(k)⊥,q∗⊥ ∈ Ker(L)⊥. Hence, from the above,
Vx∗(k) := ‖x(k)− x∗‖2H⊗IN + ‖q(k)⊥ − q∗⊥‖2cL
is bounded and non-increasing and converges to v. Thus,
since H  0 and ‖q(k)⊥−q∗⊥‖2cL > 0, ∀q⊥(k) 6= 0, the
sequence [x(k) ; q(k)⊥] is bounded, hence has at least a
limit point [x ; q⊥], where q⊥ ∈ Ker(L)⊥. Also, w(k +
1) = cLq(k) = cLq(k)⊥, has a limit point w = cLq⊥.
By Lemma 1, any limit point of x(k) satisfies x = 1N ⊗
x∗, with x∗ NE of the game and w such that (19) holds,
hence x = x∗. Consider now
Vx(k) := ‖x(k)− x∗‖2H⊗IN + ‖q(k)⊥ − q⊥‖2cL (39)
Similar to the first part of the proof for Vx∗(k) with x
∗,
cLq∗ and (28), it can be shown that Vx(k) is bounded
and non-increasing, by using (19) for x = x∗, w = cLq⊥
instead of (28). Hence, Vx(k) converges to some v ≥ 0
as k → ∞. This v is the same along any subsequence.
Since [x∗ ; q⊥] is a limit point for [x(k) ; q(k)⊥], there
exists a subsequence {kn}, kn → ∞ as n → ∞, such
that {[x(kn) ; q(kn)⊥]} → [x∗ ; q⊥] as n → ∞. Taking
limit of Vx(kn), (39), along this {kn} subsequence, as
n → ∞, it follows that v = 0. Since (H⊗IN ) 0 and
q⊥,q(k)⊥ ∈ Ker(L)⊥, taking limit in (39) as k →∞, it
follows that x(k)→ x∗, with x∗=1N⊗x∗ and x∗ NE. 
Remark 5 We note that, unlike ADMM for DOP, Wei
and Ozdaglar (2013), Hong et al. (2016), to prove con-
vergence we cannot use a common objective function
9
and common Lagrangian. Instead our proof relies on
properties of the extended pseudo-gradient F. Compared
to Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2017), Shi and Pavel
(2017), where c0 = 0 and cocoercivity of RF was as-
sumed, here we only assume Lipschitz continuity of F.
We achieved this relaxation by slightly modifying the
ADMM algorithm so that the x-update uses the extra c0>
0 parameter in the proximal-approximation (quadratic
penalty). Convergence is proved for sufficiently large c0.
This is similar to the way in which non-convexity is over-
come in ADMM for DOP in Hong et al. (2016), Wang
et al. (2015)). Based on Gershgorin theorem, a sufficient
diagonal-dominance condition can be derived for (26) to
hold, and βi parameters can be selected independently by
players (see e.g. Yi and Pavel (2017)). We note that as-
sumptions on F and F could be relaxed to hold only locally
around x∗ and x∗, in which case all results become local.
We also note that the class of quadratic games satisfies
all asumptions globally.
4.1 Convergence Rate Analysis
Next we investigate the convergence rate of Algorithm 1.
We use the following result.
Proposition 2 (Shi et al. (2015)) If a sequence
{a(k)} ⊂ R is: (i) nonnegative, a(k) ≥ 0, (ii) summable,∑∞
k=1 a(k) <∞, and (iii) monotonically non-increasing,
a(k + 1) ≤ a(k), then we have: a(k) = o ( 1k), i.e.,
limk→∞ k a(k) = 0.
For ‖z(k−1)−z(k)‖2Φ⊗IN , with z(k), Φ⊗ IN as in (36),
(36), summability follows from (38) in Theorem 1. Next
we provide a lemma showing that ‖z(k − 1)−z(k)‖2Φ⊗IN
is monotonically non-increasing.
Lemma 3 Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the se-
quence {z(k)}, (36), generated by Algorithm 1 satisfies
for all k ≥ 1,
‖z(k)− z(k + 1)‖2Φ⊗IN ≤ ‖z(k − 1)− z(k)‖2Φ⊗IN ,
where Φ⊗ IN  0 is as in (36).
Proof . Let ∆x(k + 1) := x(k)− x(k + 1), ∆q(k + 1) :=
q(k)−q(k+1), ∆z(k+1) := z(k)−z(k+1), ∆F(x(k+
1)) := F(x(k))−F(x(k+1)), ∆G(x(k+1)) = G(x(k))−
G(x(k+1)). Following similar arguments as in the proof
of Theorem 1, we obtain similar to (37), ‖∆z(k)‖2Φ⊗IN−
‖∆z(k + 1)‖2Φ⊗IN ≥ζ‖∆z(k)−∆z(k+1)‖2Φ⊗IN ≥0,where
ζ = 1− θ¯22µ¯λmin(H) > 0, by (26). 
Theorem 2 Under the same assumptions of Theorem 1,
the following rates hold for Algorithm 1:
‖x⊥(k)‖2L = o
(
1
k
)
,
where x⊥(k) ∈ Ker(L)⊥, L = L ⊗ IN , L the Laplacian
matrix of Gc, and for some y ∈ G(x(k)),
‖R(F(x(k−1))+y)+w(k+1)+c0Lx⊥(k−1)‖2(H⊗IN )−1 =o
(
1
k
)
Proof . By Theorem 1 (equation (38)),
∑∞
k=0 ‖z(k−1)−
z(k)‖2Φ⊗IN <∞. Moreover, Lemma 3 proves that ‖z(k−
1) − z(k)‖2Φ⊗IN is monotonically non-increasing. Then,
it directly follows by Proposition 2 that,
‖z(k − 1)− z(k)‖2Φ⊗IN = o
(
1
k
)
.
Expanding this by using (36) yields,
‖x(k− 1)−x(k)‖2H⊗IN + c‖q(k− 1)−q(k)‖2L = o
(
1
k
)
and, using (34) q(k − 1)− q(k) = x(k), so that
‖x(k − 1)− x(k)‖2H⊗IN + c‖x(k)‖2L = o
(
1
k
)
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can write this as
‖x(k − 1)− x(k)‖2H⊗IN + c‖x⊥(k)‖2L = o
(
1
k
)
(40)
where x⊥(k) ∈ Ker(L)⊥, x(k)⊥Lx⊥(k) > 0, for all
x⊥(k) 6= 0. If the sum of two positive sequences is o( 1k ),
then each sequence is o( 1k ), hence, by the foregoing,
‖x⊥(k)‖2L = o
(
1
k
)
.
From (40), (27), we can write ‖x(k)−x(k−1)‖2H⊗IN =
‖RF(x(k−1))+Ry+w(k+1)+c0Lx⊥(k−1)‖2(H⊗IN )−1=
o
(
1
k
)
, for some y ∈ G(x(k)). 
Remark 6 Since x⊥(k) ∈ Ker(L)⊥, ‖x⊥(k)‖2L can
be interpreted as a weighted distance from the consen-
sus subspace, while the second rate can be interpreted a
weighted distance from the optimality conditions. Unlike
DOP, e.g. Wei and Ozdaglar (2013), in a game we do
not have a common merit function for all players and
the convergence rate we are able to show is only in terms
of optimality residuals.
5 Simulation Results
In this section, we present two examples to illustrate
the performance of Algorithm 1. The first one is a net-
worked Nash-Cournot game (Example 1) as in Koshal
et al. (2016), while the second one is a rate control
game in Wireless Ad-Hoc Network (WANET), as in Sale-
hisadaghiani and Pavel (2018); Alpcan and Bas¸ar (2005).
5.1 Example 1: Nash-Cournot game over networks
In this section, we examine the performance of the pro-
posed algorithm on a networked Nash-Cournot game
(Example 1). We consider N = 20 firms and m = 7
markets, (Fig. 1). Each firm i has a local normalized
constraint as 0 ≤ xT,i ≤ 1 on its total production
xi,T = nixi, where ni is the number of markets it par-
ticipates in, hence Ωi = [0, 1/ni]. The local objective
function is taken as (20), where the local production
cost function of firm i is ci(xi) = ni
2qix
2
i +nibixi where
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Figure 3. NE computation of a Nash-Cournot game by Algo-
rithm 1 over Gc in Fig. 2. The figure shows the convergence
paths of 7 randomly selected firms.
qi, bi are randomly drawn from the uniform distribu-
tion U(1, 2). All assumptions hold globally. In the first
case, each local cost function Ji is normalized by di-
viding by n2i qi, which yields a better condition number.
The price function is taken as the linear function P =
P¯ − ZAx, where zk = 0.01 and P¯k are randomly drawn
from ZAΩi +U(1, 2). This yields λmin(Q) = 1.001 = µ,
λmax(Q) = 1.099 = θ. For a communication graph Gc as
in Fig. 2, λ2(L) = 0.102, and the bound for c0 in Lemma
2 is 22.5. We set c0 = 22.5, an arbitrary step-size c = 1,
and βi = 10 for all firms, satisfying (26). The results for
the implementation of Algorithm 1 in the partial deci-
sion setting, where the primal variables xi are exchanged
over the sparsely connected graphGc (Fig. 2), are shown
in Fig. 3. Initial conditions are randomly selected, for
xi from U(0, 0.5), and for x
i
j (i 6= j) from U(0, 1). The
results indicate fast convergence.
Next, we study an extreme case where the costs are
widely different. This yields a high condition number,
and we can study how the cost functions affect the out-
come of market competition. The qi and bi for the first
10 firms are set at the level of 0.01 while those for the
other firms are at the level of 100, and each firm i has
a local constraint 0 ≤ xi,T ≤ 100. Intuitively, this will
lead to high/low market occupation of the first/last 10
firms. The price function is taken as the linear func-
tion P = P¯ − ZAx, where zk are randomly drawn from
U(1, 10) and P¯k randomly generated such that Pk > 0
for all feasible x. This yields λmin(Q) = 1.482 = µ,
λmax(Q) = 1005 = θ, and the bound for c0 in Lemma
2 is 6e6. However, we found this bound conservative in
our experiments. We plot the sequences of relative er-
ror (vs. the ’true’ NE obtained by (centralized) gradi-
ent method) under different parameter settings in the
top sub-figure of Fig. 4. The trends reflected in the top
sub-figure of Fig. 4 match the intuition of our algorithm
design (see Appendix A) and the implication of (26) in
Theorem 1. In general, smaller penalty parameters c, c0,
and βi’s lead to faster convergence but they have to be
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Figure 4. NE computation of a Nash-Cournot game by Algo-
rithm 1 over Gc in Fig. 2. The top figure plots relative error
‖x(k)−x∗‖
‖x(0)−x∗‖ vs. iteration number k. The bottom figure shows
the convergence paths of 7 selected firms.
large enough to guarantee convergence. An instance of
the first 104 iterations of trajectories of selected firms
are plotted in the bottom sub-figure of Fig. 4. The initial
estimate for xi−i’s are randomly drawn from (0, 200); to
observe diverse firm trajectories, the first 5 and last 5
firms’ local xii’s are initialized as the upper limits of their
local constraints, respectively, while the other firms start
from 0. This way, we can see four cases: (1-5) “aggressive
start, rich end”; (6-10) “conservative start, rich end”;
(11-15) “conservative start, poor end” (16-20) “aggres-
sive start, poor end”.
5.2 Example 2: Rate control game over WANET
In this section we consider an engineering network-
protocol example for a rate control game over a Wireless
Ad-Hoc Network (WANET), Alpcan and Basar (2002);
Alpcan and Bas¸ar (2005). Consider 16 mobile nodes
interconnected by multi-hop communication paths in a
WANET Fig. 5 (a). N = 15 users/players want to trans-
fer data from a source node to a destination node via
this WANET. In Fig. 5 (a) solid lines represent physical
links and dashed lines display unique paths that are
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Figure 5. (a) Wireless Ad-Hoc Network (left). (b) Commu-
nication graph Gc (right) for Example 2.
assigned to each user to transfer its data. Each link has
a positive capacity that restricts the users’ data flow.
In this WANET scenario there is no central node. Each
user/player is prescribed to communicate locally with
its neighbours over a preassigned (sparse but connected)
communication graph Gc, e.g. as depicted in Fig. 5 (b).
In Fig. 5 (b) a node represents a player, and an edge
in the graph signifies the ability for the two players to
exchange information. Each user exchanges information
locally (thus mitigating the lack of centralized informa-
tion), so that he can estimate the other flows and, based
on them, adjust its own decision which is his data rate.
Here is the list of WANET notations:
(1) Lj : Link j, j = 1, . . . , 16,
(2) Ri: The path assigned to user i, i = 1, . . . , 15,
(3) Cj > 0: Link j’s capacity, j = 1, . . . , 16,
(4) 0 ≤ xi ≤ 10: The data flow of user i, i = 1, . . . , 15.
Each path consists of a set of links, e.g., R1 = {L2, L3}.
Each user i decision (action) is its data rate flow 0 ≤
xi ≤ 10 to send over Ri, based on its cost function Ji,
Ji(xi, x−i) :=
∑
j:Lj∈Ri
κ
Cj −
∑
w:Lj∈Rw xw
−χi log(xi+1),
which depends on the flows of the other users, and where
κ > 0 and χi > 0 are network-wide known and user-
specific parameters, respectively. In this case λ2(L) =
0.18 and the other assumptions hold locally. For χi = 10
∀i = 1, . . . , 15 and Cj = 10 ∀j = 1, . . . , 16 we compute
numerically ‖DF (x)‖2 and ‖DF(x)‖2 over Ω, θ0 = 4.7,
θ = 6.7. The bound for c0 in Lemma 2 is 30.7. We set
c0 = 31, hence µ¯ = 0.04, an arbitrary step-size c = 1
and βi = 14, ∀i = 1, . . . , 15 (by (26) in Theorem 1).
We compare our Algorithm 1 with the gossip-based one
proposed in Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2018) run over
Gc, with diminishing-step sizes. The results are shown
in Fig. 6, for uniform randomly selected initial condi-
tions. The simulation results show that Algorithm 1 is
about two orders of magnitude faster than the one in
Salehisadaghiani and Pavel (2018).
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Figure 6. Flow rates of users 1, 3, 5, 8, 13 using Algo-
rithm 1 (solid lines) vs. algorithm in Salehisadaghiani and
Pavel (2018) (dashed lines). NE represented by black stars.
6 Conclusions
We designed a distributed NE seeking algorithm in gen-
eral games by using an inexact-ADMM approach. Each
player maintains action estimates for the others, ex-
changed with its neighbours over a connected, undi-
rected communication graph. The game was reformu-
lated as a modified game with virtual consensus con-
straints for the action estimates, and solved within the
framework of inexact-ADMM. An inexact-ADMM al-
gorithm was designed which was shown to convergence
to the NE of the game under strong monotonicity of
the pseudo-gradient and Lipschitz continuity of the ex-
tended pseudo-gradient. The convergence rate of the al-
gorithm was compared with that of an existing gossip-
based NE seeking algorithm. To deal with the merely
monotone case (thus with possibly multiple NEs) we
leave for future work; this would require more involved
computations even on the consensus subspace. As other
directions for future work we can mention: (1) exten-
sion to directed communication graphs, (2) adaptation
to games with networked structure (where computation
and memory could be reduced if each player maintains
only its own required estimates), (3) designing incentives
to ensure that players truthfully share their states and
auxiliary variables.
A Derivation of ADMM Algorithm 1
In the following we show how Algorithm 1 can be derived
based on an ADMM approach adapted for a game setup.
Using slack variables tij , tji associated with each edge to
separate the constraints and IΩi(xii) for the feasibility
constraint xii ∈ Ωi, we write (10) as
minimize
xi
i
∈R
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i) + IΩi(xii), ∀i ∈ V
subject to xi = tij ; ∀j s.t. (i, j) ∈ E
xi = tji; ∀j s.t. (j, i) ∈ E
(A.1)
and similarly for player j. We cannot directly use a stan-
dard ADMM algorithm because each minimization in
12
(A.1) is not over the whole xi as in DOPT, cf. (1), but
rather only over part of it (action xii), and inherent cou-
pling to the others’ decisions still exists indirectly, via the
estimates xi−i. Note that in (A.1), since minimization of
Ji is only over the action component x
i
i, for the other (es-
timate) components xi−i we can consider a zero objective
function. We will develop an ADMM-type algorithm to
solve (A.1) in a distributed manner. Let {uij , vji} ∈ RN
be the Lagrange multipliers of player i, associated with
the constraints in (A.1) (source, destination), and sim-
ilarly, {uji, vij} ∈ RN , for player j, respectively. Let
Nouti = {j| (i, j) ∈ E} and N ini = {j| (j, i) ∈ E}, and
since Gc is undirected, N
in
i = N
out
i = Ni. We show
next how the algorithm can be derived and simplified
so that each player maintains only its dual variables
wi :=
∑
j∈Ni u
ij +vji, not all its Lagrangian multipliers
{uij , vji}. The auxiliary variables tij , tji are obtained
based on minimizing the overall augmented Lagrangian,
Lc({xi},{tij , tji}};{uij , vji};{uji, vij}) :=∑
i∈V
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i)
+
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
uij
T
(xi − tij) +
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
vji
T
(xi − tji) (A.2)
+
c
2
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
‖xi − tij‖2 + c
2
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈Ni
‖xi − tji‖2
Based on (A.2), tij , tji are updated as:
tij(k)=arg min
tij
Lc({xi(k−1)},{tij}; {uij(k−1),vij(k−1)})
tji(k)=arg min
tji
Lc({xj(k−1)},{tji}; {uji(k−1),vji(k−1)})
or, since Lc is quadratic in tij , tji, in closed-form as
tij(k)=
uij(k−1)+vij(k−1)
2c
+
xi(k−1)+xj(k−1)
2
(A.3)
tji(k)=
uji(k−1)+vji(k−1)
2c
+
xj(k−1)+xi(k−1)
2
For each player i ∈ V we consider an augmented La-
grangian associated to (A.1), where c > 0,
Lci
(
xi, tij , tji; {uij , vji}) := Ji(xii, xi−i) + IΩi(xii)
+
∑
j∈Ni
uij
T
(xi − tij) +
∑
j∈Ni
vji
T
(xi − tji) (A.4)
+
c
2
∑
j∈Ni
‖xi − tij‖2 + c
2
∑
j∈Ni
‖xi − tji‖2
For player i its dual variables {uij , vji} are updated by
dual ascent with c as the step-size, based on (A.4),
uij(k) = uij(k − 1) + c(xi(k − 1)− tij(k)), (A.5)
vji(k) = vji(k − 1) + c(xi(k − 1)− tji(k)).
Similarly, for player j’s, based on Lcj , its {uji, vij} are,
uji(k) = uji(k − 1) + c(xj(k − 1)− tji(k)), (A.6)
vij(k) = vij(k − 1) + c(xj(k − 1)− tij(k)).
Considering uij(0) = vij(0) = uji(0) = vji(0) = 0N and
using (A.3) in (A.5),(A.6) yields
uij(k) + vij(k) = 0N ∀ k ≥ 0
uji(k) + vji(k) = 0N ∀ k ≥ 0.
so that (A.3) become,
tij(k) =
xi(k − 1) + xj(k − 1)
2
= tji(k). (A.7)
Using (A.7) to eliminate tij(k), tji(k) from (A.5), yields
uij(k) = uij(k − 1) + c
2
(
xi(k − 1)− xj(k − 1))
vji(k) = vji(k − 1) + c
2
(
xi(k − 1)− xj(k − 1)).
Then for wi(k) :=
∑
j∈Ni u
ij(k) + vji(k), this yields
wi(k) = wi(k−1)+ c
∑
j∈Ni
(xi(k−1)−xj(k−1)) (A.8)
where c > 0, as in Step 5 of Algorithm 1. Thus, the aux-
iliary variables tij , tji can be eliminated using (A.7) and,
based on (A.4), for each player i ∈ V only the dual vari-
ables wi(k) (A.8) are needed to update his action xii(k)
and estimates xi−i(k), using his and his neighbours’ pre-
vious estimates, xi(k−1), xj(k−1), j ∈ Ni. Specifically,
minimizing (A.4) w.r.t. xii and with (A.7), for each i ∈ V
the local update for xii(k) = xi(k) (decision) is
xii(k) = arg min
xi
i
∈R
{
Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i(k − 1)) + IΩi(xii) (A.9)
+wii(k)
Txii + c
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xii − xii(k − 1) + xji (k − 1)2 ∥∥∥2}.
Note that in DOP, where the cost fi(xi) is separable in xi
(cf. (1)), in the update of xi, coupling appears only lin-
early due to the quadratic terms, e.g., Wei and Ozdaglar
(2013), Hong et al. (2016). In contrast, in (A.9) the xii
problem is coupled nonlinearly to xi−i(k−1) (due to the
inherent coupling in Ji) and linearly to x
j
i (k − 1). As in
an inexact ADMM, instead of solving exactly an opti-
mization sub-problem, each player uses a linear proxi-
mal approximation to reduce the complexity of each sub-
problem. We approximate Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i(k−1)) in (A.9) by a
proximal first-order approximation around xii(k−1), but
inspired by Hong et al. (2016), with an extra quadratic
penalty, which yields
xii(k)=arg min
xi
i
∈R
{∇iJi(xi(k−1))T(xii−xii(k−1))
+
βi
2
‖xii−xii(k−1)‖2+IΩi(xii) (A.10)
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+wii(k)
Txii+c¯
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xii− xii(k − 1)+xji (k−1)2 ∥∥∥2
 ,
where βi>0, c¯ = c+ c0, c0 ≥ 0. This is equivalent to
xii(k)=arg min
xi
i
∈R
{
IΩi(xii)+
αi
2
∥∥∥xii−α−1i [−∇iJi(xi(k−1))
+βix
i
i(k−1)−wii(k)+c¯
∑
j∈Ni
(
xii(k−1)+xji (k−1)
)]∥∥∥2},
where αi = βi + 2c¯|Ni|. Using (5) and proxαiIΩi{·} =
TΩi{·}, each player i updates its action xii(k) = xi(k) as
in Step 6 of Algorithm 1. Finally, each player i updates
its estimates of the other players’ actions xi−i(k). This
update is similar to (A.9) but ignoring the Ji(x
i
i, x
i
−i)
term (which is minimized only w.r.t. xii, see (A.1)), i.e.,
xi−i(k) = arg min
xi−i∈RN−1
{
wi−i(k)
Txi−i
+c¯
∑
j∈Ni
∥∥∥xi−i − xi−i(k − 1) + xj−i(k − 1)2 ∥∥∥2}.
Following the same proximal approximation, the update
for xi−i(k) is obtained as in Step 7 of Algorithm 1.
B Proof of Proposition 1
The stacked vector update for w, (18), follows from
Step 5 of Algorithm 1. From Step 6 in Algorithm 1,
αix
i
i(k) = TΩi{y} = proxIΩi {y}, where y is the term
in the square-bracket on the right-hand side of Step 6.
From Proposition 16.34, Bauschke and Combettes
(2011), p = proxIΩi{y} ⇔ y − p ∈ ∂IΩi(p). Thus,
αix
i
i(k) = proxIΩi{y} ⇔ y − αix
i
i(k) ∈ ∂IΩi(αixii(k))
⇔ y − αixii(k) ∈ ∂IΩi(xii(k)) since αi > 0. Expand-
ing y as on the right-hand side of Step 6 and using
αi = βi + 2c¯|Ni| > 0 this is equivalent to
0∈∇iJi(xii(k − 1), xi−i(k − 1))+∂iIΩi(xii(k))+wii(k)+
(βi+2c¯|Ni|)xii(k)−βixii(k−1)−c¯
∑
j∈Ni
(xii(k−1)+xji (k−1))
i.e.,
0∈∇iJi(xii(k − 1), xi−i(k − 1))+∂iIΩi(xii(k))+wii(k) +
(βi+2c¯|Ni|)(xii(k)−xii(k−1))+c¯
∑
j∈Ni
(xii(k−1)−xji (k−1)).
From Step 7 in Algorithm 1, one can obtain for xi−i,
0N−1 = (βi + 2c¯|Ni|)(xi−i(k)− xi−i(k − 1)) + wi−i(k)
+c¯
∑
j∈Ni
(xi−i(k−1)−xj−i(k−1)).
Combining these two relations into a single vector one
for all components of xi = (xii, x
i
−i), yields ∀i ∈ V
0N ∈∇iJi(xi(k − 1)) ei + ∂iIΩi(xii(k)) ei+wi(k)+
(βi+2c¯|Ni|)(xii(k)−xii(k−1))+c¯
∑
j∈Ni
(xii(k−1)−xji (k−1)).
In stacked vector form for all i ∈ V this yields
0N2∈[∇iJi(xi(k−1))ei]i∈V +[∂iIΩi(xii(k))ei]i∈V +w(k)
+((B+ 2c¯D)⊗ IN )(x(k)− x(k − 1))
+c¯(L⊗ IN )x(k − 1),
where x = [xi]i∈V , w = [wi]i∈V , B = diag([βi]i∈V ),
D = diag([|Ni|]i∈V ), which can be written as (18). 
Proof of Lemma 2
We decompose the augmented space RN2 into the con-
sensus subspace Ker(L) = {1N ⊗ x |x ∈ RN} and its
orthogonal complement Ker(L)⊥. Any x ∈ RN2 can be
decomposed as x = x‖ + x⊥, with x‖ ∈ Ker(L), x⊥ ∈
Ker(L)⊥, (x‖)Tx⊥ = 0, Thus x‖ = 1N⊗x, for some x ∈
RN ‘, so that Lx‖ = 0, and minx⊥∈Ker(L)⊥(x⊥)TLx⊥ =
λ2(L)‖x⊥‖2, where λ2(L) > 0. Similarly, we can write
any y ∈ Ker(L) as y = 1N ⊗ y, for some y ∈ RN
and Ly = 0. Then, using x = x‖ + x⊥, F(x‖) = F (x),
F(y) = F (y), RTx‖ = x, RTy = y we can write
(x−y)T(R(F(x)−F(y))+c0L(x−y))
= (x‖−y)TR(F(x)−F(x‖)+F(x‖)−F(y))
+(x⊥)TR
(
F(x)−F(x‖)+F(x‖)−F(y))
+c0(x
‖+x⊥ −y)TL(x‖ + x⊥−y))
= (x− y)T(F(x)−F(x‖))+ (x− y)T(F (x)− F (y))
+(x⊥)TR
(
F(x)−F(x‖))+(x⊥)TR(F (x)−F (y))
+c0(x
⊥)TLx⊥ (B.1)
Using strong monotonicity of F (by Assumption 2) for
the second term, and properties of L on Ker(L)⊥ for
the fifth term on the right-hand side we can write,
(x−y)T(R(F(x)−F(y))+c0L(x−y))
≥ (x− y)T(F(x)−F(x‖))+ µ‖x− y‖2
+(x⊥)TR
(
F(x)−F(x‖))+(x⊥)TR(F (x)−F (y))
+c0λ2(L)‖x⊥‖2 (B.2)
We deal with the cross-terms by using aT b ≥ −‖a‖‖b‖,
for any a, b, and ‖Rb‖ ≤ ‖R‖2‖b‖, so that
(x−y)T(R(F(x)−F(y))+c0L(x−y))≥
−‖x− y‖ ‖F(x)−F(x‖)‖+ µ‖x− y‖2
−‖x⊥‖‖R‖2‖F(x)−F(x‖)‖−‖x⊥‖‖R‖2‖F (x)−F (y)‖
+c0λ2(L)‖x⊥‖2 (B.3)
Using ‖R‖2 = 1 and Lipschitz properties of F and F,
(x−y)T(R(F(x)−F(y))+c0L(x−y))≥
−θ‖x− y‖ ‖x⊥‖+ µ‖x− y‖2 − θ‖x⊥‖2− θ0‖x⊥‖‖x−y‖
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+c0λ2(L)‖x⊥‖2 (B.4)
Using ‖x− y‖ = 1√
N
‖x‖−y‖ and Ψ, (24), we can write
(x−y)T(R(F(x)−F(y))+c0L(x−y))≥[‖x‖−y‖‖x⊥‖
]T
Ψ
[
‖x‖−y‖
‖x⊥‖
]
Thus,
(x−y)T(R(F(x)−F(y))+c0L(x−y))≥ µ¯(‖x‖−y‖2 + ‖x⊥‖2) ,
where µ¯ := λmin(Ψ). Using ‖x‖−y‖2 +‖x⊥‖2 = ‖x−y‖2,
this can be written as (25). For c0 as in the statement,
Ψ  0, hence µ¯ > 0. 
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